This paper examines the relation between the regulatory threshold on mandatory disclosure of financial forecasts and the detachment of control rights from the cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. Using data for 2,628 forecasts issued by Taiwanese listed corporations, where the ownership structure is analogous to that of most East Asian countries, we find that the firms' initial earnings forecasts tend to violate the regulatory threshold in the presence of the greater control divergence of controlling owners. Also, we find that firms with serious agency problems embedded in the ownership structures tend to manage forecast errors (FE) (for example, revising the forecasts and/or adjusting actual earnings) so as to meet the regulatory threshold as the end of the fiscal year approaches. Thus, our empirical evidence is consistent with the notion that weaker corporate governance is related to poor financial disclosure quality. A policy implication of these findings is that policymakers should take the ownership structure and financial practices into account before establishing a comprehensive set of rules and regulations for financial reporting.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a dramatic proliferation of research concerned with the quality of earnings disclosure (Ajinkya et al., 2005; Chin et al., 2007; Karamanou and Vafeas 2005) . In East Asian nations, including Taiwan, information credibility and levels of disclosure are relatively lower than some Western countries (for example, U.S. and U.K.). In 1991, Taiwan's regulators (Taiwan Securities and Futures Exchange Commission, TSFEC) published "Guidelines for Disclosure of Financial Forecasts by Public Companies," order to promote information transparency. Under these guidelines, Taiwanese firms are required to issue earnings forecasts when they raise funds in the capital market. The motivation for this rule is to simultaneously strengthen the operating efficiency of the Taiwanese equity market, reduce information asymmetry and remedy the market's failure to produce quality financial forecasts. Despite efforts by TSFEC to enact stringent accounting reporting rules, the majority of investors continue to doubt the quality of accounting information (Fan and Wong, 2002) . It is important, therefore, for regulators and researchers to understand why reported financial information in the region has low credibility.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the association between the mandatory earnings forecasts disclosure and the corporate governance structure in Taiwan -a country that features relatively weak investor protecttion inferior legal enforcement, firms with controlling, shareholders, and lower disclosure levels.
1 First, we examine whether firms with more serious agency problems resulting from control-cash flow rights divergence of the ultimate (controlling) owners would release less accurate forecasts that are violating the regulatory threshold, as stipulated by the regulations. Second, we also examine whether these firms are inclined to manipulate forecast errors (FE) through revision of their forecasts and/or adjusting reported earnings (RE) with discretionary accruals so as to meet the threshold as the end of the fiscal year approaches.
Numerous studies demonstrate how the agency problem between owners and managers affects the role of accounting in management compensation contracts, and how the reporting incentives of managers affect a firm's accounting information quality (Fan and Wong, 2002; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Rajgopal et al., 2002; Chin et al., 2006) . This literature shows that, in a diffuse ownership is associated with greater earnings in formativeness. Based on the work of Coffee (2005) , Jensen and Meckling, (1976) and others, it has been argued that an increase in managerial ownership reduces the conflicts of interest between owners and managers and enhances earnings in formativeness because managers have less need to manage earnings in order to alleviate constraints. On the contrary, in East Asian corporations, including Taiwan enterprises, the high concentration of ownership is not completely applicable to the principalagent problem between owners and managers. Instead, the real conflict is between minority investors (Haw et al., 2004) and controlling owners, who enjoy almost total control over both managerial personnel (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and financial disclosure decisions (for example, management forecasts).
Prior studies suggest that the quality of management forecasts provides an obvious indication of management credibility. For example, Tan et al. (2002) and Williams (1996) argue that the accuracy of management forecasts captures management reputation and competence. Similarly, Rogers and Stocken (2005) found that forecast error is not random and that it varies with management incentives and the property of corporate governance. We posit that effective corporate governance is an additional factor that may determine the extent of management forecast error. Therefore, the first research question examined in this paper is whether the probability that a given firms' earnings forecasts violates the regulatory threshold is associated with the divergence between the ultimate owners' control and the equity ownership level. To address this issue, we use a sample of listed firms in Taiwan and provide arguments.
First, it is well documented that earnings forecasts provide a channel to communicate information about the firms' future prospects (Ajinkya and Gift, 1984; Patell, 1976) and aid the firm in raising capital (Frankel et al., 1995) . In Taiwan, listing firms are required to release mandatory earnings forecasts when they want to raise capital through external investors in the securities markets. Jaggi et al. (2006) also reported manager may be in order to obtain higher issuance proceeds by issuing more optimistic forecasts.
2
In Taiwan, the ultimate owners use their control over firms to benefit themselves at the expense of smaller shareholders. When firm with higher levels of wealth expropriation, they are likely to increase with the degree of the agency problem. Yeh et al. (2004) , Huang and Liu (2010) and Wang et al. (2010) found that the adverse affect of related party transactions on firms is positively associated with the degree of agency problem. In addition, strict supervision of the behavior of the ultimate owners is lacking, resulting in such violations as diverting firm's assets outside the company for private use. Spending cash flow on acquisitions or other unprofitable projects undertaken with the aid of unrealistically high forecasts of future profitability gives the management a bigger company to run, thereby increasing their power and prestige in the community (agency costs). Hence, we argue that the ultimate owners employ their power over financial reporting to issue future earnings forecasts that are more inaccurate, thereby promoting the market value of their holdings (Jaggi et al., 2006) , and promoting future wealth exploitation.
Second, in order to maintain the controlling owners' private control, he/she needs to avoid external monitoring by managing reported accounting earnings (Haw et al., 2004) , leading to reduced earnings in formativeness (Fan and Wong, 2002) . This may lead to lower earnings forecast in formativeness . We attempt to determine whether the controlling owners seek to reduce external monitoring by issuing less accurate mandatory earnings forecasts. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) , Tan et al. (2002) and Williams (1996) argue that management issuing accuracy earnings forecasts provides an indication regarding management credibility and competence. Accuracy of forecasts may be a doubleedged sword. On one hand, controlling owners who issue positively biased forecasts may tempt other parties to enter their industry. On the other hand, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) argue that better well-run firms may be 2 Examples of companies intentionally manipulating their financial forecasts are found in the following article, which is excerpted from the Chineselanguage Liberty Times newspaper (Dec 20, 2004) : "…Several corporations use their financial forecasts as a tool for manipulation of stock prices, for example, King Yuan Electronics, just listed in 2001, simultaneously issued financial forecasts of NT$1.711 billion in profits, but immediately revised these downward three times, to NT$1.104 billion in losses. In another case, Macronix proclaimed that operations would be improved in a conference call on June of 2002, but then, unusually, revised downward its forecast to NT$ 96.55 billion in losses in July of 2002, because much of its inventory has no sales value. The above two cases represent unusual and unreasonable downward forecast revisions, which may not be intentional. However, if the goal of the company is to drive up the stock price, it could issue more optimistic forecasts, then revise them downward substantially after profittaking." more likely to provide firms with less "misinformation" by issuing more accurate forecasts. Less well-run firms, or those with weaker governance mechanisms may have incentives to issue forecasts that are more inaccurate. Whether the purpose is to avoid scrutiny by external parties of the true success of the firm, to avoid attracting new entrants into the industry, or to hide private control benefits, more tightly controlled firms have an incentive to understate their potential profitability by issuing errors earnings forecasts. Therefore, such errors would be understated forecasts. Although doing so would loss the firm's ultimate owner a higher price on equity offerings, they may believe that whatever gains on equity offerings they abandon by, in effect, understating the share value may be retrieved at some later date when the true state of nature is discerned. Further, if firms issue understated forecasts to prevent new entrants into their market as noted by Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) , the firms issue forecasts that understate potential earnings help ensure the continuance of their market share into the future. Therefore, firms with larger control divergence may prefer to understate earnings for the sake of avoiding critical scrutiny if a positively biased forecast is not met. On balance, we expect that the ultimate owners have incentives to release inaccurate forecasts to protect and improve their own economic position, especially in the divergence between control and ownership.
Our second question is whether firms with serious agency problems are more likely to adjust FE to meet the regulatory threshold, especially as the end of fiscal year approaches. We elaborate this issue as follows. To reduce information asymmetry for firms with access to the capital market, the TSFEC regulations stipulate that Taiwanese corporations are required to include earnings forecasts in their prospectuses, mandating penalties for firms that exceeded the threshold of the forecast error set by the TSFEC standard. As Jaggi et al. (2006) point out, the final forecast before the announcement of actual earnings was required to be within 20% of actual earnings. Firms may apply two options in achieving earnings forecast accuracy, however. On the one hand, the firms can improve forecast accuracy by modifying the forecast itself. On the other hand, they can decrease forecast error through revising and/or manipulating discretionary accruals (Jaggi et al., 2006; Kasznik, 1999) . As stated above, firms with serious agency problems are likely to release unrealistic forecasts out of self-interest. The FE of such firms are required to undergo greater adjustment, based on the requirement of the regulatory threshold. This implies that such firms will make greater revisions either by revising the earnings forecasts, as allowed under the TSFEC regulation, or by manipulating the RE using discretionary accruals. Consequently, we expect that the firms with greater control divergence tend to adjust forecasts errors to bring them near the regulatory threshold as the end of the fiscal year approaches.
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Using a sample of 2,628 earnings forecasts that are disclosed by 912 firms listed in Taiwan from 1996 through 2004, our results document a positive association between the likelihood of a given firms' initial forecasts deviating from the regulatory threshold and the degree of agency problem, suggesting that the ultimate owners benefit themselves by releasing untruthful or uninformative forecasts. Further, we find that in the case of serious agency problems the firms tend to adjust FE to bring them near the threshold as the end of the period approached, indicating that such adjusted FE do not significantly vary with the level of concentrated voting rights control by the end of the year.
Several features of this study are different from prior research. First, this study focuses on an ownership context different from that of research on U.S. companies. Warfield et al. (1995) found that an increase in managerial ownership improves the price in formativeness of earnings. Unlike Warfield et al, we highlight the extent of the detachment between control and cash flow rights of the ultimate owners in listed firms outside the U.S. This detachment can create formidable conflicts of interest between insiders and minority shareholders. Although Fan and Wong (2002) found that the discrepancy between control and cash flow right of the controller weaken the in formativeness of reported income, there is no evidence of association between this discrepancy and the property of management financial forecasts disclosure. The findings of this study help explain inaccurate earnings forecasts in firms with high levels of divergence between control power and cash flow rights. Second, several studies (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999) show that firms managed RE to meet earnings or analysts' expectations thresholds. This study provides indirect evidence that managers can manipulate the RE to meet the regulatory threshold.
From the policy perspective, this study sheds light on the question of whether disclosure regulation is performed well in an emerging market (Taiwan). Therefore, it is important to consider the ownership structure and financial practices before establishing rules and regulations for financial reporting (Ball et al., 2000; Fan and Wong, 2002; Leuz et al., 2003) .
Disclosure regulation and corporate governance structure in Taiwan

Disclosure regulation
Most Taiwanese listed firms are less willing to disclose financial information to outside investors than Western firms . Thus, investors often lack sufficient reliable information to accurately evaluate the financial position of firms. Furthermore, outside investors do not have access to information relevant to the firms' prospects, thus producing an essential information asymmetry.
In order to increase information transparency and promote the development of capital markets, the TSFEC issue a regulation requiring firms to disclose earnings forecasts. With a view to ensure board accountability, the regulations specify that management earnings forecasts should be validated by the board of directors and supervisors. Regulations also specify that forecasts must not exceed the actual (reported) earnings by more than 20%.
3 If the management FE go beyond the 20% threshold, the penalty for firms is that they are not permitted to raise additional capital in the market without special permission. Nevertheless, the regulations permit management to revise their earnings forecasts without any limitation on the number of revisions before actual earnings are reported.
Corporate governance structure in Taiwan
A number of studies (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Morck et al., 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) have noted that widely dispersed corporate ownership is not common. Instead, ownership of corporations is concentrated in the hands of particular families or wealthy investors. La Porta et al. (1999) further illustrated the concept of ultimate controlling shareholders. They found that family or state control and high controlling power are extensive throughout 27 wealthy countries. The controlling shareholders usually have significant voting rights in excess of their cash flow rights through pyramid structures and participation in management. Claessens et al. (2000) studied ownership structure in 9 Asia nations, and applied the definitions of the ultimate owners proposed by La Porta et al. (1999) . There is evidence that the ultimate owners exist in most firms where there is a high discrepancy between control rights and cash flow rights. Similarly, more than half of these firms are family controlled. Moreover, Yeh et al. (2001) reported, in a sample of Taiwanese listed companies for 1994-1995, that firms with ultimate control are characterized as largely family controlled, with a high level of concentrated ownership.
The typical ownership structure in Taiwan is familycontrolled ownership, where there are close ties between the controlling families and top management, and separation in the controlling shareholders' control power from their cash flow rights. The ultimate owners leverage their resources by the use of stock pyramids and crossholdings, as well as by management participation and use of share classes that have more votes than others. Because of significant separation of control rights and cash flow rights, the ultimate owners have the power to expropriate wealth at the expense of the minority shareholders. Thus, an agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders exists. As suggested by Ko et al. (1999) and Iwu-Egwuonwu (2010), major institutional investors appear to be short of interest in corporate governance. 4 Hence, these investors do not perform an effective role in corporate governance. Disciplinary tools such as takeovers and hostile bids are not effective mechanisms for corporate control, due to the predominance of the family ownership pattern.
RESEARCH DESIGN Data source and sample selection
The sample consists of Taiwanese listed firms for the period 1996 through 2004. Due to the availability of information with respect to corporate ownership structure data from 1996, the sample period of this study starts from 1996. The corporate ownership structure data, management forecast and financial data of the sampled companies were collected from the Taiwan Economics Journal (TEJ) database. The firm level financial data and mandatory forecast are also retrieved from the TEJ database. The sample selection criteria are described as follows: First, firms in regulated industries such as finance, banking, and utilities are eliminated from the sample because of different financial incentives. Second, the ownership of voting rights of ultimate controlling shareholders is defined at or above a 10% threshold (La Porta et al., 1999) . Finally, firms must possess mandatory forecast information during the sample period. The final sample that met our requirements was 2,628 firm-years. Table 1 indicates details on the firm years and industry distribution based on the two-digit TEJ industry codes. As shown in Panel A of Table 1 , the number of firms rose from 161 in 1996 to 431 in 2004. Panel B of Table 1 reports that the electronics industry is the largest group in the sample (52.05%). The remaining sample is widely dispersed throughout the TEJ industry codes. No other industry comprises more than 8% of the sample.
Calculation of forecast errors (FE)
The FE are computed as the divergence between the predicted earnings (PE) and RE divided by the absolute value of PE. If the FE is greater than zero, it means that PE are higher than RE, and these forecasts are referred to as optimistic forecasts. If the FE is less than zero, it indicates that RE are higher than PE, and these forecasts are referred to as conservative forecasts. In order to assess the magnitude of FE for different stages of managerial behavior, we define two types of FE.
First, we define FE based on the difference between first predicted earnings (FPE) (without any revisions) and pre-managed actual earnings (PME), and term it initial forecast errors (FEB). The PME is measured by subtracting total discretionary accruals (TDA) from the RE. This FE represents the magnitude of FE before revision of the forecasts and/or manipulation of RE using discretionary accruals. Further, it reveals the amount of FE that needs to be reduced in order to fall within the regulatory threshold.
(1) Second, we compute FE based on the last revision of forecasts (LPE) and RE, and represent it as post-managed forecast error (FEA). This expresses whether the FE is within the 20% threshold and it also describes the magnitude of FE after forecasts are revised and/or earnings are adjusted with discretionary accruals.
(2)
Estimation of discretionary accruals
TDA have been extensively used in earnings management studies. We use the cross-sectional modified Jones model proposed by Dechow et al. (1995) to calculate TDA, 5 as follows. First, total accruals (TA) are computed as follows:
5 Dechow et al. (1995) and Guay et al. (1996) suggest that the modified Jones model is more capable of detecting earnings managements and diminishing measurement errors.
(3)
Where TAit, total accruals for firm i in year t; ∆CAit, change in current assets for firm i in year t; ∆CLit , change in current liabilities for firm i in year t; ∆CASHit, change in cash for firm i in year t; ∆STDit, change in short-term debt for firm i in year t; DEPTNit, depreciation and amortization expense for firm i in year t.
Second, the parameter coefficients for computing TDA are estimated from Equation 4:
Where TAit, total accruals, defined as above; ∆REVit, change in net revenues for firm i in year t; ∆ARit, change in accounts receivable for firm i in year t; PPEit, gross property plant and equipment for firm i in year t; Ait-1, totals assets for firm i in year t-1; εit, error term for firm i in year t. Finally, the TDA are calculated by using estimated parameters from Equation 4:
6 Following DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), we estimate equation (4) cross-sectionally for each two-digit Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) code industry and each year. In order to assure sufficient data for parameter estimation, at least six firm-year observations are required in a two-digit TEJ code.
( )
Where signifies TDA for firm i in year t.
The control-cash flow rights deviations
The definitions of voting (control) rights and cash flow rights of the ultimate owners are taken from La Porta et al. (1999) . The ultimate owners are defined as having ultimate controlling power spread across the corporation. While a company can have more than one ultimate owner, we focus on the largest ultimate owner. For instance, if a company is controlled by a family, the definition of the largest ultimate owner contains those with blood and marriage ties to the immediate family and all of the legal entities controlled by those family members. Their individual voting rights are summed to find the total family voting rights. In the most cases, the immediate shareholders of a company are themselves corporate entities, or investment corporations and other legal entities, for example, nonprofit-foundations. We then identified their owners, the owners of their owners, and so on. For each family group, the total ownership is defined as a group of people related via blood or marriage, as the unit of analysis. The voting rights possessed by the ultimate owners are a total of direct and indirect voting rights in the company. Direct voting rights are enrolled in the name of the ultimate owners and indirect voting rights are owned via shares held by other companies controlled by the ultimate owners. The cash flow rights are the product of ownership shares over control chains. 7 We use the ultimate owners' divergence in voting rights from cash flow rights to evaluate the entrenchment effects. When the ownership is highly concentrated among the ultimate owners with a greater deviation in cash flow and control rights, the ultimate owners are more likely to maximize their own utility at expense of the minority shareholders and reduce the quality of the earnings forecast.
Empirical models
Control cash flow rights deviations and the probability of violating the 20% threshold
To evaluate our first prediction concerning the association between the deviation in control away from cash flow rights and the likelihood of violating the regulatory threshold, we estimate the following logit regression model. otherwise.
8 Gap variablesit are defined as proxy variables for corporate governance, and can be broken down into two variables. The first is the divergence from cash flows rights to voting rights (CVit), which is the ratio of cash flows rights over voting rights. Additionally, we use the amount of difference between control rights and cash flow rights (ECVit), calculated as control rights minus cash flow rights.
As in previous studies, we include a variety of control variables in our regression. Baginski and Hassell (1997) suggest that the accuracy of earnings forecast would be affected by firm size (SIZEit). We measure firm size as the natural logarithm of beginning total assets. Previous research shows that historical information held by the firm is a factor in causing the decrease of FE (Jelic et al., 1998; Mak, 1989) , measured as firm age (AGEit) being the number of years since listing date. Choi and Ziebart (2000) showed that the FE or bias rises as the forecast horizon rises. We compute the forecast horizon, TIMEit, using the number of months between initial management earnings forecasts announcement date and the earnings announcement date. Lee and Chou (2002) argued that management forecast in formativeness increases as managerial reputation increases. We measure the managerial reputation, REPUit, using the prior five years' managerial average forecast precision. Fan and Wong (2002) and Yeh (2005) found that the ultimate owners frequently participate in management to enhance their control power and control financial reporting policy. We construct a dummy variable PMit set equal to one if the ultimate owner serves as the chairman or chief executive officer (CEO) of the company, and zero otherwise. IND are dummy variables indicating a firm's industry membership based on two-digit TEJ codes. YEAR represents dummies for years 1997 through 2004. For ease of presentation, industry and year dummy coefficients are suppressed.
Control cash flow rights deviations and the distribution of forecast errors
We now attempt to verify our second prediction about the association between the deviation in voting rights from the cash flow rights and the distribution of FE. First, we construct a histogram of the frequency distribution of FE at the control-cash flow rights (CV) ratio equal to 1 and less than 1. 9 We predict that the discrepancy in control away from the cash flow rights is associated with clustering at the 20% threshold. Additionally, we conduct a Zstatistical test for a discontinuity at the 20% threshold, following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) . 10 We predict that the deviation of cash-control rights is positively related to a discontinuity at the 8 A few observations, where the firm has an FEB of less than 0.20 and an FEA greater than 0.20, as well as when the firm has an FEB and FEA both exceeding 0.20, are deleted from our sample. This represents a total of 7 and 27 observations, respectively. 9 The bin width is calculated as 2(IQR)N -1/3 following Degeorge et al. (1999) .
IQR is the interquartile range of FEA and N is the number of observations. Given our sample size, the bin width is computed to equal two pennies. 10 Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) address a null hypothesis as the distribution of earnings being smooth at 0. The Z-statistical value is denoted as follows: For any given interval, the expected number of observations is computed as the average of the number of observations in the two close neighbor intervals. The standard deviation is denoted as [Npi(1-Pi)+(1/4)N(Pi-1+pi+1)(1-pi-1-pi+1)] -1/2 , where N is the number of observations, and pi is the probability that an observation belongs to interval i. The Z-value is then derived from the difference between actual and expected number of observations, divided by the standard deviation.
OLD=1)=F(α +α Gap_variables +α SIZE +α AGE +α TIME ∑ ∑ 5 it 6 it n m it +α REPU +α PM +α IND+α YEAR+ε ) ∑ ∑ threshold, especially for adjacent bands. Lastly, we estimate the following logit regression.
In Equation . Consistent with previous studies, the use of control variables is defined as follows. Becker et al. (1998) suggested that the operating cash flows (OCFit) are negatively associated with discretionary accruals, which is computed as operating cash flow deflated by total assets. Following prior research the level of leverage may induce earnings manipulation using discretionary accruals (Becker et al., 1998; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994) , measured as the debt ratio (DEBTit). Previous studies indicate that FE may be affected by earnings violability (Imhoff, 1978) , CVARit, measured by the coefficient of variation using the prior five year' EPS. We also included firm performance ROA that is earnings before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. All other variables are measured as given in Equation 6.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Univariate analyses
Panel A of Table 2 presents the results of the descriptive statistics for variables selected in our sample. The mean (median) of EV and CAS is 32.491% (30.135%) and 26.385% (23.365%), respectively, indicating that average firms displayed high concentration of control. The mean (median) of CV is 0.811 (0.942), showing that the control rights of the ultimate owners are significantly in excess of their equity ownership level. Similarly, the mean (median) of mean excess control (ECV) is 6.106% (1.500%), indicating that, on average, the excess control is possessed by the ultimate owners. Further, the mean firm size has a natural logarithm of beginning total assets, which is equivalent to a book value of NT $8225.062 million. The mean (median) of AGE is 19.954 (18.000). The mean (median) of TIME is 13.125 (13.000), suggesting that the firm releases its initial earnings forecast during April. The means of OCF and CVAR are 0.072 and 0.647. DEBT's mean (median) is 0.391 (0.385), indicating that firms are debt-financed to a considerable degree. The mean (median) of REPU is 0.421 (0.153). The mean (median) of PM is 0.772 (1.000), indicates that the level of controlling owner serving as the chairman or CEO of the company is higher.
Panels B and Panel C of Table 2 Table 2 , the mean degree of the deviation in CV and the ECV for the outer sample is significantly higher than the inner sample, as predicted. For the control variables, the means and medians difference of SIZE, AGE, TIME, REPU, and PM between the two groups are statistically significant. Panel C of Table 2 reports that the mean levels of corporate governance variables with the adjacent sample are significantly greater than those with the distant sample, consistent with our prediction. For other control variables, the means and medians difference of OCF, CVAR, DEBT, REPU and PM between the two groups are strikingly different. Table 3 gives a correlation matrix of all variables in our analyses, with Pearson (Spearman) correlations in the upper (lower) triangle. Panel A and Panel B of Table 3 provide the correlations between dependent variables (THRESHOLD or DFR), and the corporate governance variables are all statistically significant in line with the predicted direction. CV is negatively related to THRESHOLD (DFR) and ECV is positively associated with THRESHOLD (DFR). The preliminary evidence indicates that greater control rights divergence is associated with a higher probability of violating the 20% threshold for initial forecast errors and a higher probability of clustering at the 20% threshold for post-managed forecast errors. Findings from the following logit regression analyses represent more careful connections for all variables. Table 4 presents the results of the logit regression model based on Equation 6. Model 1 includes the discrepancy between control and cash flow rights represented by the ultimate owners (CV) and shows that the coefficient estimate of CV is significantly negative. In Model 2, we include the excess control held by the ultimate owners (ECV), and the coefficient estimate of ECV is positive and statistically significant. As described above, the results are consistent with our first prediction in Models 1 and 2, suggesting that for firms with more serious agency problems, the likelihood of initial forecast errors exceeding the 20% threshold increases.
Multivariate analyses
Result of control cash flow rights deviations on the probability of violating the 20% threshold
A marginal effect analysis is also adopted for each The sample consists of 2,628 firm-year observations for the fiscal years 1996 to 2004. EV, the voting rights level of the largest ultimate owner; CAS, the cash flow rights level of the largest ultimate owner; CV, the ratio of cash flow rights over voting rights; ECV, the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights; SIZE, the natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the year; AGE, the number of years since listing date; TIME, the number of months between initial management earnings forecasts announcement date and the earnings announcements date; OCF, the operating cash flows divided by total assets at the beginning of the year; DEBT, the total liability divided by total assets at the beginning of the year; REPU, the managerial reputation using the prior five years' managerial average forecast precision; PM, dummy variable that equals one if the ultimate owner serves as the chairman or CEO of the company and zero otherwise; CVAR, the coefficient of earnings' variation using the prior five years' EPS; ROA, earnings before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. a We classify firms as outer sample when their initial forecast errors (FEB) are greater than the 20 % regulatory threshold and post-managed forecast error (FEA) are less than it; otherwise, firms are classified as inner sample. FEB is calculated as the difference between FPE and pre-managed earnings, divided by the absolute value of first predicted earnings. FEA is calculated as the difference between last revision of forecast and reported earnings, divided by the absolute value of the last revision of the forecast. b We classify firms as adjacent sample when their FEA falls into adjacent intervals of the 20 percent threshold, which are (-0.16~-0.18), (-0.18~-0.20), (0.16~0.18) , and (0.18~0.20); otherwise, firms are classified as distant sample. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively, on two tailed tests.
corporate governance structure variable of the logit model. The marginal effect indicates the change in probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent variable estimated at the mean values of the , and 0 otherwise; EV, the voting rights level of the largest ultimate owner; CAS, the cash flow rights level of the largest ultimate owner; CV, the ratio of cash flow rights over voting rights; ECV, the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights; SIZE, the natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the year; AGE, the number of years since listing date; TIME, the number of months between initial management earnings forecasts announcement date and the earnings announcements date; OCF,the operating cash flows divided by total assets at the beginning of the year; DEBT, the total liability divided by total assets at the beginning of the year; REPU, the managerial reputation using the prior five years' managerial average forecast precision; PM, dummy variable that equals one if the ultimate owner serves as the chairman or CEO of the company and zero otherwise; CVAR, the coefficient of earnings' variation using the prior five years' EPS; ROA, earnings before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. Numbers in the parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively, on two tailed tests. Table 4 . Logit analysis of the probability of violating the 20% threshold.
Variable
Predict sign (1) The sample consists of 2,628 firm-year observations for the fiscal years 1996 to 2004. THRESHOLD, a dummy variable equal to one if the firm's FEB is greater than 0.20 and FEA is less than 0.20 and zero otherwise; CV, the ratio of cash flow rights over voting rights; ECV, the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights; SIZE, the natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the year; AGE, the number of years since listing date; TIME, the number of months between initial management earnings forecasts announcement date and the earnings announcements date; REPU, the managerial reputation using the prior five years' managerial average forecast precision; PM, dummy variable that equals one if the ultimate owner serves as the chairman or CEO of the company and zero otherwise. Dummy variables for industry and year are included in the models, but not reported. Numbers in the parentheses are Z-statistics. The marginal effects are calculated as e β'X / (1+ e β'X ) 2 , where β'X is calculated at the mean values of X. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively, on two tailed tests.
regressors. The marginal effect for CV in Model 1, -0.1088, when multiplied by the inter-quartile range (0.268), indicates that moving from the first to the third quartile of CV decreases the probability of violating the 20% threshold by approximately 2.92%. In Model 2, a similar analysis indicates that moving from the first to the third quartile of ECV increases the probability of violating the 20% threshold by 1.76%.
Regarding the control variables, both models show that the coefficients of SIZE are significantly negative, as expected, suggesting that the likelihood of violating the 20% threshold declines with firm size.
11 Similarly, the results of AGE are also significantly negative, implying that the large number of years since the establishing date is negatively related with the deviating forecast threshold. In contrast, the coefficients of TIME are significant and positive. That is, a firm with a long forecast horizon is more likely to exceed the threshold. The coefficient on REPU is positive and significant, suggesting that better managerial reputation significantly decreases the likelihood of firm's earnings forecasts violate the threshold. The sign of PM is significantly positive. Thus, having controlling owners participate in management is more likely to result in inaccurate forecasts and consequent violation of the threshold.
Control cash flow rights deviations on the distribution of forecast errors
This section investigates whether firms with control-cash flow deviations have a central tendency to the distribution of management earnings forecast errors (MFE) close to the 20% threshold. Figure 1 plots the distribution of MFE, and we categorize the observations based on the controlcash flow deviation (CV<1) and non control-cash flow deviation (CV=1). Panel A illustrates the association between the CV ratio and the MFE.
Panel A of Figure 1 shows the results with the CV ratio at less than 1, indicating the distribution with an irregularity close to the 20% threshold. There is a large jump in the distribution nearly at the left of the 20% threshold, as predicted. On the contrast, Panel B of Figure 1 displays the outcome when the CV ratio equal to 1. The result shows that there is a smoothing distribution over intervals. Table 5 presents the results of the logit regressions regarding the likelihood of post-managed forecast errors clustering at the 20% threshold. The coefficient of CV is significantly negative in Model 1. In Model 2, the coefficient of ECV is positive and significant. The results support our second prediction that the likelihood of FEA being concentrated at the threshold point increases with the degree of agency problems.
Additionally, a marginal effect analysis is conducted in our logit regression. In Model 1, the coefficient of marginal effect for CV is -0.0735, showing that moving from the first to the third quartile of CV diminishes the probability of centering immediately at the 20% threshold by approximately 1.97%. In the same way, the coefficient of ECV in Model 2 is 0.0018, indicating that moving from the first to the third quartile of ECV raises the probability of centering immediately at the 20% threshold by approximately 1.26%.
Regarding the control variables, each model shows that the coefficient of OCF is significantly negative, and those of CVAR, DEBT, REPU, and PM are significantly positive, implying that firms with more operating cash flow, higher earnings volatility, higher leverage, poor managerial reputation, and ultimate controlling person participating in management are more likely to manage forecast errors so that they concentrate at the 20% threshold.
Sensitivity analysis
To verify the results for robustness, we conducted another proxy for earnings management to reexamine the association between the control-cash flow rights deviations and the likelihood of violating the 20% threshold. We use current discretionary accruals (CDA) in evaluating earnings management (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998) . First, total current accruals (TCA) are calculated as follows: (8) Where TCA it , total current accruals for firm i in year t; ∆CA it , change in current assets for firm i in year t; ∆CASH it , change in cash for firm i in year t; ∆CL it , change in current liabilities for firm i in year t; ∆STD it , change in short-term debt for firm i in year t.
Finally, CDA are estimated by using Equation 9:
Where TCA it , total current accruals for firm i in year t; ∆REV it , change in net revenues for firm i in year t; ∆AR it , 0 1 it 2 it 3 it 4 it 5 it 6 it n m it Prob(THRESHOLD=1)=F(α +α Gap_variables +α SIZE +α AGE +α TIME
TCA /A =α 1/A +α (∆REV /A -∆AR /A )+ε change in accounts receivable for firm i in year t; A it-1 , totals assets for firm i in year t-1; ε it , error term for firm i in year t. The residual estimated from Equation 9 is CDA for firm i in year t. As shown in Table 6 , the results are qualitatively and statistically similar to those reported in Table 4 using CDA to compute the forecast error. This suggests that the likelihood of violating the 20% threshold rises when the voting rights of the ultimate owners exceed their cash flow rights. The sample consists of 2,628 firm-year observations for the fiscal years 1996 to 2004. DFR, a dummy variable equal to one if the firm's FEA falls into adjacent intervals of the regulatory threshold, which are (-0.16~-0.18), (-0.18~-0.20), (0.16~0.18), and (0.18~0.20) , and 0 otherwise; CV, the ratio of cash flow rights over voting rights; ECV, the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights; OCF, the operating cash flows divided by total assets at the beginning of the year; DEBT, the total liability divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. REPU is the managerial reputation using the prior five years' managerial average forecast precision; PM, dummy variable that equals one if the ultimate owner serves as the chairman or CEO of the company and zero otherwise; CVAR, the coefficient of earnings' variation using the prior five years' EPS; ROA, earnings before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. Dummy variables for industry and year are included in the models, but not reported. Numbers in the parentheses are Z-statistics. The marginal effects are calculated as eβ'X / (1+ eβ'X) 2 , where β'X is calculated at the mean values of X. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively, on two tailed tests. 
Conclusion
Poor earnings in formativeness and information opacity are well-known problems for firms listed on stock exchanges in East Asian countries. The corporate ownership structure is an essential determinant of the quality of The sample consists of 2,628 firm-year observations for the fiscal years 1996 to 2004. THRESHOLD, a dummy variable equal to one if the firm's FEB is greater than 0.20 and FEA is less than 0.20 and 0 otherwise; CV, the ratio of cash flow rights over voting rights; ECV, the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights; SIZE, the natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the year. AGE is the number of years since listing date; TIME, the number of months between initial management earnings forecasts announcement date and the earnings announcements date; REPU, the managerial reputation using the prior five years' managerial average forecast precision; PM, dummy variable that equals one if the ultimate owner serves as the chairman or CEO of the company and zero otherwise. Dummy variables for industry and year are included in the models, but not reported. Numbers in the parentheses are Z-statistics. The marginal effects are calculated as e β'X / (1+ e β'X ) 2 , where β'X is calculated at the mean values of X. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively, on two tailed tests. earnings information. The fundamental agency problem of Taiwanese firms stems from the detachment between the ultimate controlling shareholders' voting rights and cash flow rights. In order to improve the information disclosure for publicly listed firms in Taiwan, the TSFEC has mandated that firms release earnings forecasts when they are raising capital via issuing equity or debt securities. The purpose of this research is to examine the association between disclosure of mandatory earnings forecasts and corporate governance structures, measured as control-cash flow rights deviations.
The results of our study indicate that when firms have Prob(THRESHOLD=1)=F(α +α Gap_variables +α SIZE +α AGE +α TIME +α REPU +α PM +α IND+α YEAR+ε ) ∑ ∑ greater control-cash flow deviations, the likelihood of violating the regulatory threshold for the initial earnings FE increases. We interpret this to mean that the ultimate owners are likely masking their wealth extraction from firms through issuing inaccurate earnings forecasts; hence, the deviation between the first earnings forecast and pre-managed earnings may surpass the 20% threshold. Additionally, we find evidence that the postmanaged FE, adjusted by revising forecasts and/or manipulating discretionary accruals, will cluster at the threshold point when the control rights held by the ultimate owners exceed their cash flow rights. A possible explanation is that the ultimate owners may seek to avoid regulatory penalties and diminish the likelihood of outside intervention. Thus, they may adjust forecast errors toward the 20% threshold as the end of the year approaches. This study makes several contributions. First, we explore the role of agency problems on earnings forecasts. In East Asian nations, agency conflicts occur between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, which are typically related to poor legal investor protection. This is different from firms in the U.S or U.K, which are characterized by a diffuse ownership structure, where the agency conflicts are between managers and outside investors. This study may be help to lay the groundwork for understanding the decision implications of the ultimate owners. Second, we further contribute to the earnings forecasts literature by examining the effect of corporate governance structure on the likelihood of violating the regulatory threshold. Previous research has primarily addressed the determinants of voluntary earnings disclosure (Ajinkya et al., 2005; Chin et al., 2007; Kasznik, 1999) . We shed light on another regulation of earnings disclosure in accounting research. Finally, our results also contribute to earnings management studies. Several studies (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999) have provided evidence that managers are inclined to engage in earnings management to arrive at different thresholds, such as maintaining positive profits and recent earnings levels, or meeting analysts' expectations, when they announce actual earnings. We find evidence that firms with serious agency problems may adjust forecast errors by using discretionary accruals to meet the regulatory threshold.
The findings of this study also have implications for policy and should be generalized to other countries in the Asia-Pacific region. There is ongoing debate about the significance of corporate governance reforms in AsiaPacific countries. This debate should also be a concern of US policymakers, given the imperfections of the U.S. market revealed by several accounting frauds. The disclosure of mandatory earnings forecasts is stipulated by some developing economies. For instance, it is necessary to issue earnings forecasts for initial public offerings (IPO) firms in Taiwan, Malaysia and Singapore. In simple terms, this means the market is assumed to be imperfect. Consequently, regulators play a considerable role. This research may provide references for Hsu et al. 65 policymakers and regulators regarding the influence of agency problems on management earnings forecasts in East Asian countries. The regulators can then improve board governance and earnings forecasts provisions to enhance the transparency of board activities and to provide a more robust information environment. In sum, our findings indicate that policymakers should take into consideration the ownership structure and financial practices before establishing a comprehensive set of rules and regulations for financial reporting (Ball et al., 2000; Leuz et al., 2003) .
There is a potential limitation in our research. As noted by Claessens et al. (2000) and Haw et al. (2004) , the measure of control divergence is probably with error because the data on the ultimate owners' control and cash flow rights are constructed by using only listed corporations. If unlisted corporations have ownership connections with listed firms, the estimates for control and ownership could well be underestimated. This type of measurement error is potentially an important issue for firms in countries such as Taiwan where stock markets and legal and extra-legal infrastructures are not mature. We believe, however, that the variance arising from the existence of any such error most likely will work against supporting our hypotheses. Though the effect of unmeasured variables must always be uncertain, it appears that only systematic variance can generate support for a hypothesized statistical relationship.
Because the TSFEC does not make any information available on actions taken by it against firms with forecast error violations, it is not possible to incorporate the penalty perspective in the analysis of the selection of forecast revisions and the use of discretionary accruals to decrease the forecast error. If information on penalties for the violating firms becomes available, future work may provide better insight into the impact of penalties on the relation between agency problems and FE manipulation.
